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may not bar the presentation, consideration or use of relevant mitigating
evidence at the penalty phase of a capital trial. More recently, in Penry,
the Court found that resolution of a claim that the Texas death penalty
scheme prevented the jury from considering and giving effect to certain
types of mitigating evidence, "was dictated byLockett andEddings,"and
that it therefore, did not involve the creation ofa new rule under Teague.
Penry, 109 S. Ct. at 2947.
Despite the fact that the Teague framework severely limits the
scope of federal habeas review, the court's holding in Penry gave new
hope to the capital defense community that the Teague standards could
be met. Penry, required something "new" of a Texas system that had
been previously approved by the Court in Jurekv. Texas, 428 U.S. 262
(1976), and suggested that enforcement of the broad commands set out
in Lockett and Eddings would not constitute a new rule under Teague.
However, the Court's holdings in Parks, Butler and Sawyer have effectively destroyed most of the optimism generated by Penry.
In support of his contention that the antisympathy instruction
violated the eighth amendment, Parks argued that an antisympathy
instruction was barred byLockett andEddings"because jurors who react
sympathetically to mitigating evidence may interpret the instruction as
barring them from considering that evidence altogether." Parks,110 S.
Ct. at 1262. The Court disagreed with Parks' argument, stating that it
"misapprehends the distinction between allowing the jury to consider
mitigating evidence and guiding their consideration." Id.
In an effort to keep from deciding Parks' constitutional challenge,
the Court recharacterized his claim as one contesting the ability of a state
to dictate the mannerin which ajury may consider mitigating evidence.
This enabled the majority to find that Parks' requested relief would
constitute a new rule under Teague. The recharacterization of Parks'

claim seems to have made a distinction without a difference. There is no
significant difference between a jury instruction that directly limits the
jury from considering and giving effect to mitigation evidence and one
that achieves the same result in the course of telling the jury how it can
consider and give effect to that evidence. Both instructions will erect
barriers to a sentencer's understanding and ability to give effect to
mitigation evidence. Parks may also be a sign that the Court, by using its
"manner of consideration" rubric, intends to slowly dig away at established mitigation case law which, heretofore, has been a bulwark of
capital defense. Because this has not yet been explicitly done, however,
defense counsel should continue to insist that trials be conducted in a
manner that does not permit barriers of any kind to the presentation,
consideration, and use by the sentencer of any evidence proffered as a
basis for a sentence less than death.
In Parks,Butler and Sawyer, the Court has taken the position that
requested relief will constitute a "new rule" on collateral review unless
it is absolutely compelled by an earlier case and that no other court could
reasonably find otherwise. These decisions will bar federal review of
many claims which allege that trials were conducted in violation of the
U.S. Constitution. Consequently, it is even more important for trial
attorneys to insure that additional claims are not lost by waiver and
default. One way to do this is to learn all of the law, state and federal,
upon which a defendant is entitled to rely at trial. Substantial pretrial
time may be required to do this research. Constitutional claims based on
existing law, properly raised and preserved, are not affected by Teague
and its progeny.
Summary and analysis by:
Catherine M. Hobart
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FACTS
Sawyer's conviction and death sentence became final in 1984
with the denial ofcertiorari by the United States Supreme Court. Sawyer
petitioned for federal habeas corpus review on the grounds that the
prosecutor's closing argument during the penalty phase of his trial
diminished the jury's sense of responsibility for the capital sentencing
decision in violation of Caldwell v. Mississippi,472 U.S. 320 (1985).
Caldwell established the rule that the eighth amendment prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty by a sentencer who has been led to
believe that the responsibility for determining the appropriateness ofthe
capital sentence rests elsewhere.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Louisiana and the Court ofAppeals denied relief. Sawyer petitioned for
rehearing, and the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The
Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed. Justice Kennedy wrote
the 5-4 majority opinion.

HOLDING
The Court refused to address the petitioner's Caldwell claim,
holding that Caldwell relief was a "new rule" decided after Sawyer's
sentence became final, and therefore, unavailable to Sawyer. Under
Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060 (1989), a petitioner cannot receive the
retroactive benefit of a decision if such decision establishes a "new rule"
and does not fall within one of two exceptions. Teague defined a new rule

as a rule one that "breaks new ground or imposes a new obligation on the
States or the Federal Government," or that "was not dictated by precedent
existing at the time the defendant's conviction became final."Id. at 1070
(emphasis in original). The primary purpose of Teague is to ensure that
federal habeas corpus review of state convictions holds state courts to
compliance with the federal law in existence at the time a conviction
becomes final.
Sawyer argued that the Caldwell claim was based on the heightened eighth amendment due process requirements of capital cases, and
therefore, was dictated by Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982);
Lockettv. Ohio,438 U.S. 586 (1978); Gardnerv.Florida,430 U.S. 349
(1977); and Woodson v.North Carolina,428U.S. 280 (1976). The Court
rejected this argument on the grounds that the principles of heightened
reliability expressed in those cases were too generalized, and further, the
cases did not expressly deal with improper argument.
Sawyer also argued that the pre-Caldwell case, Donnelly v. De
Christoforo,416 U.S. 637 (1974), warned state courts about improper
argument. The Supreme Court refused to recognize this argument
because Donnelly dealt with improper argument in a non-capital fourteenth amendment"fundamental faimess" claim, and not theheightened
eighth amendment reliability basis of Caldwell.
Two narrow exceptions exist under Teague. "First, a new rule
should be applied retroactively if it places 'certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the powerof the criminal law-making
authority to proscribe."' Teague v. Lane, 109 S Ct. 1060, 1073 (1989)
(quoting Mackey v. UnitedStates, 401 U.S. 667,675 (1971)(Harlan, J.
separate opinion)). Second, a new rule will be applied retroactively if it
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is a "watershed" rule that is essential to the fundamental fairness of the
proceeding. Saiwyerv. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822,2831 (1990). Although the
first exception also covers classes of people not subject to the death
penalty, it did not apply to the Sawyer case because it did not involve a
"primary, private individual conduct," nor was he a member of a
protected group such as the extremely young or retarded. See Penry v.
Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989); Thompson v. Oklahoma,487 U.S. 815
(1988) (See summary of Saffle v. Parks, Capital Defense Digest, this
issue.)
The court evaluated Sawyer's claim under the second Teague
exception, and held the Caldwell claim to be insufficiently fundamental.
"It is thus not enough under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at
improving accuracy oftrial. More is required. A rule that qualifies under
this exception must not only improve accuracy, but also 'alter our
understanding of the bedrock procedural elements' essential to the
fairness of a proceeding." Teague, 109 S. Ct. at 1076 (quoting Mackey,
401 U.S. at 693)(emphasis in original).

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA

to the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal process. All
eighth amendment jurisprudence in capital cases is directed towards
accuracy and reliability, and if the standard for the second exception
were not so extreme, much new eighth amendment law could satisfy the
second exception.
The Court majority opined that a lesser standard would undermine
the principles of finality that are essential to the functioning of the
criminal justice system. "The 'cost imposed upon the State(s) by
retroactive application of the new rules of constitutional law on habeas
corpus thus generally far outweigh the benefits of this application."'
Sawyer, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2831-32 (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S.
638, 654 (1984)). In the view of the majority, the interest in reliability
of a death sentence established in Eddings, Lockett, Gardner, and
Woodson, is balanced against the interest in finality, and the cost to the
states. Eighth amendment reliability loses.
Sawyer clearly continues the narrowing of federal habeas corpus
review, and consequently re-emphasizes the importance of trial and
direct appeal. Therefore, it is more important than ever to avoid waiver
and default at trial by making federalized objections, including objecting
to the prosecutor's argument on Caldwell grounds.
Summary and analysis by:
Robert L. Powley

The Supreme Court essentially closed the door on the second
exception under Teague. Justice Kennedy made it very clear that it is
unlikely the court will find any new components of dueprocess essential

WALTON v. ARIZONA
110 S. Ct. 3047, 111 L.Ed.2d 511 (1990)
United States Supreme Court

FACTS

HOLDING

Petitioner Jeffrey Walton and two codefendants encountered the
victim, Thomas Powell, at a bar in Tucson. After robbing Powell at
gunpoint, the trio forced the victim into his own car and drove him into
the desert. Walton marched Powell into the desert, forced him to lie
down on the ground and shot him once in the head. A medical examiner
later determined that the gunshot wound did not immediately kill Powell
and that Powell regained consciousness before dying of starvation and
dehydration.
Walton was convicted of first-degree murder, armed robbery,
kidnapping, and theft by control. Under the Arizona first-degree murder
statute, the capital sentencing hearing must be conducted before the trial
judge. The court must impose the death sentence if it finds first, one or
more of the aggravating circumstances listed in the statute and second,
that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call
for leniency. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-703(E) (Repl. Vol. 1988).
At Walton's sentencing hearing, the judge found two aggravating
circumstances: (1) that the murder was committed in an especially
heinous, cruel ordepraved manner, and (2) that the murder was committed
for pecuniary gain. The judge also concluded that there were no
mitigating factors sufficiently substantial to call for leniency. On direct
appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court upheld Walton's sentence. Walton
contended that Arizona's "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved"
aggravating circumstance, as interpreted by the Arizona courts, fails to
channel the sentencer's discretion as required under the Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether
Arizona's application of the "especially heinous, cruel, or depraved"
aggravating circumstance satisfied the requirements of the eighth and
fourteenth amendments to the Constitution.

The Supreme Court held that Arizona's "especially heinous, cruel
or depraved" aggravating circumstance was constitutionally sufficient
because the Arizona Supreme Court gave substance to the operative
terms ofthestatute through use ofanarowingconstruction or definition,
and because the trial judge, rather than ajury, determines the sentence.
The trial judge is presumed to know and to apply the narrowing
constructions. The Arizona court previously had stated that a crime is
committed in an especially cruel manner "when the perpetrator inflicts
mental anguish or physical abuse before the victim's death" and that
"mental anguish includes a victim's uncertainty as to his ultimate fate."
State v. Walton,769 P.2d 1017,1032 (Ariz. 1989). Further, an especially
depraved manner occurs when the perpetrator either "relishes the
murder, evidencing debasement or perversion," or shows an "indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense of pleasure" in
the killing. 769 P.2d at 1033. The Supreme Court concluded, therefore,
that these definitions gave meaningful guidance to the sentencer and
thus were constitutional.

ANALYSIS/APPLICATION IN VIRGINIA
In order to prevent the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment,
the eighth amendment requires a method ofmeaningfully distinguishing
cases in which the death penalty is imposed from the many cases in
which it is not. Godfrey v. Georgia,446 U.S. 420,433 (1980).
One method of making the required distinction is to require the
application of a narrowing construction to aggravating circumstances.
Recently, the Court found Oklahoma's "especially heinous, atrocious,

